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1I. Introduction
Silicone breast implants have been the subject of much debate. The prod-
uct entered on the market without having been adequately tested, and in the
late 1980s, pressure mounted on the Federal Food and Drug Agency (FDA) to
ascertain the risks associated with these implants or remove them from the mar-
ket. In April 1992, FDA decided that the information available was insucient
to establish the safety of silicone breast implants, and access was restricted to
women participating in clinical trials. Although some hailed the decision as a
necessary protective measure, many commentators have criticized the agency's
nal choice, as well as the decision-making process that preceded it.
This paper will present the history of FDA's policy regarding silicone breast
implants, as well as an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these actions.
Although FDA Commissioner David Kessler's essential judgment that the im-
plants had not been proven safe was sound, both in evaluating the nature and
quality of the scientic evidence available, and in adhering to the Congressional
guidelines for the type of proof necessary before a device can be approved for
marketing, there were many aws along the way.
In terms of FDA' s internal procedures, the breast implant case has demon-
strated that more rigorous standards should be set for the data that is reviewed
in determining a product's safety and eectiveness, and in selecting the advisory
panels that will evaluate this data. In addition, the public confusion and con-
cern that arose regarding the dangers of implants highlight the necessity for a
carefully considered public information strategy to better manage the messages
conveyed to the public, particularly through mass media outlets.
The decision to distinguish between women seeking breast implants for aug-
mentation and those desiring reconstructive surgery after mastectomies may
prove to have been a unique policy
2dilemma for FDA, in that most choices will not involve the assessment of
psychological benets of a product in determining if approval is warranted.
Nevertheless, the controversy that was stirred exemplies the dilemma FDA
faces in setting policies that are not overly restrictive of individual autonomy
yet suciently protective of public health.
2
3II. Background on Breast Implants
In 1962, Dow Corning introduced the rst silicone gel breast implants, con-
sisting of a rubbery silicone envelope containing silicone gel. These devices were
viewed as a great improvement over the direct silicone injections that had been
used from the 1940s until that time, and that had caused painful and disguring
side eects when scar tissue developed around the silicone globules. Certain side
eects became apparent almost from the outset, and both Dow and the other
manufacturers that later joined the market competed to improve the devices.
The saline-lled implant was a signicant innovation designed to combat the
problem of gel leakage. This product was thought to be safer, because any leak-
age would be of harmless saline. There are drawbacks with this type of implant
as well, however. The consistency of saline implants is not as natural as that
of those lled with silicone gel, and if the implants are not lled correctly they
can be too hard or can crumple and cause wrinkles in the skin around them.
In addition, they can spontaneously empty. For these reasons, before FDA's
1992 action removing silicone implants from the market, 97 percent of women
who had implants chose those lled with silicone gel. At this point, by default,
saline-lled implants are the type most commonly used, but a new version is
being developed that uses soybean oil as the lling substance.
The early customers for breast implants were mostly actresses and showgirls,
but over time, more women viewed implants as a method of enhancing self-
esteem. In addition, the early users sought unnaturally large implants to please
male audiences, but as augmentation became more widespread, most women
merely wanted to feel more normal rather than to be conspicuous. The pattern
of implant use seen in a midwestern community indicates that in 1991, the
average
MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OE EVIDENCE
AND TUE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 38-44 (1996).
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4age of implant recipients was 36, and approximately 85 percent of the women
receiving implants were married. This pattern is probably fairly representative
of the rest of the country, although implant use is more popular in some regions
of the country than others.2
Silicone gel breast implants present various risks for women receiving them,
both short-term and long-term, local and systemic. As with any implanted de-
vice, a risk of local infection exists. Additionally, there are risks that the capsule
will rupture, releasing the silicone and reducing the eectiveness of the device.
The incidence of this problem is unknown3, and measuring its prevalence is
complicated by the phenomenon known as silent rupture, when women are un-
aware that their implants have ruptured until the leakage is detected through
a mammogram or the woman specically investigates the condition of her im-
plants with her physician.4 The syndrome of gel bleed presents another localized
risk. Molecules of the silicone gel migrate through the pores in the surrounding
envelope, and tiny particles can escape into the nearby lymph glands.5 Another
side eect is capsular contracture, a contraction of scar tissue that squeezes the
implant, making it hard and unnaturally rounded. The contracture produces
visible bulges in the breast and can cause painful hardening.6 ft is estimated
that to some extent, this occurs for one-third to one-half of silicone implants.7
2 Id. at 46-47.
3
As of 1995, the studies suggested a rate between 5 and 51%, and scientists
were unable to
determine with any condence where within that enormous range the ac-
tual rate lies. Hearings on Silicone Implants Be/ore the Subcomm. on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Govern-
ment Reform and Oversight, lxx Cong., xx Sess. xx (1991) (statement of David
A. Kessler, M.D., Commissioner, FDA, and D. Bruce Burlington, M.D., Dir.,
Center for Devices and Radiological Health). [hereinafter Kessler statement].
Kessler statement, supra note 3.
5
ANGELL, supra note 1, at 41.
61d at 40.
HOUSE COMM. ON GOVT. OPERATIONS, HR. REP. No. 101-1006,
101st Cong., 2nd Sess (1990), available in WESTLAW, 1991 WL 10980 (Leg.
Hist.).
4
5The long-term systemic eects of implants are still uncertain. At one time,
researchers suspected that implants increased the risk of breast cancer, yet the
evidence available in 1995 indicates that no increased incidence of breast cancer
or any other type of cancer is associated with silicone gel implants. Two major
epidemiological studies that were ongoing for 10 years by 1995 provide denitive
data that breast implants does not induce an increased risk of breast cancer. In
certain cases, silicone implants may interfere with the accuracy of mammogra-
phy, and further research is needed to assess whether specialized techniques can
obviate this problem.8
The risk that has received the most attention and caused the most contro-
versy is that of autoimmune disorders, grouped generally as connective tissue
diseases. These diseases include very rare illnesses, such as scleroderma and lu-
pus, and relatively more common conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis, and
bromyalgia.9 These disorders involve a disturbance in the immune
system that produces an autoimmune response. A civil war within the body
ensues, producing io
extreme weakness and fatigue, and causing damage to the joints, skin, and
internal organs.
8 Silicone gel breast implants, JAMA 2602, Dec. 1, 1993, 1993 WL 12281182
[hereinafter JAMA].
Kessler statement, supra note 3.
10
ANGELL, supra note I, at 21.
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6III. History of FDA Actions
A. 1976 Amendments
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act as passed in 1938, FDA
had limited authority to regulate medical devices. The agency could only act
against products deemed adulterated12 or misbranded13, and only after such
devices were introduced into interstate commerce. The only enforcement reme-
dies available were seizure, injunction, and recommending criminal prosecution.
With the devices on the market at that time, this mechanism was appropri-
ate. Most devices were simple so professionals could recognize defects. Thus,
the main concern of FDA was assuring truthful labeling and removing grossly
hazardous products from the stream of commerce. i4
The post-World War II era bio-medical revolution brought a wide variety of
sophisticated medical devices into use, such as the pacemaker, kidney dialysis
machine, debrillators, cardiac and renal catheters, surgical implants, articial
vessels and heart valves, intensive care monitoring units, and other diagnostic
and therapeutic devices. At times, these devices were introduced without ad-
equate premarket clinical testing, quality control in the materials selected, or
patient
21 U.S.C. x 301 et seq.
12 Adulterated is dened as containing a lthy, putrid, or decomposed sub-
stance, or having been
prepared, packed or held under insanitary conditions. 21 U.S.C. x 351 (a)(
1).
i3 A product is misbranded if it bears labeling that is false or misleading; that
fails to identif~y the
manufacturer, packer, or distributor and quantity of contents; that does
not incorporate the required labeling statements prominently; that fails to bear
adequate directions for use or adequate warnings; or if the product is dangerous
to the health when used as indicated. 21 U.S.C. x 352.
~ COMM. ON INThRSTATE AND FOREIGN COM., REPORT
ON MEDICAL DEVICE
AMENDMENTS OF 1976, HR. REP. No. 94-853, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
at 6 (1976), reprinted in FOOD AND DRUG LAW INSTITUTE, AN ANA-
LYTICAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MEDICAL DEVICE AMEND-
MENTS OF 1976, app. III (1976).
6
7consent. Thus, although these items were legitimate medical devices, they did
present hazards to public safety, and in the early 1960s, FDA began to focus on
these dangers. 15
With the expansion of the agency's authority over drug regulation accom-
plished by the 1962 amendments, FDA was able to control the distribution
of some products generally regarded as devices by classifying these products
as drugs, and therefore within FDA's domain. This approach did not achieve
enough, however, largely due to the uncertainty surrounding which devices the
courts would agree could legitimately be considered a drug. 16
By the end of the decade, concerns mounted about the prevalence of in-
juries and deaths caused by medical devices.'7 Presidents Kennedy, Johnson,
and Nixon recognized that giving FDA statutory authority to prevent the mar-
keting of devices without adequate premarket testing could have prevented these
deaths and injuries. Late in 1969, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare convened a study group, chaired by Dr. Theodore Cooper, to evaluate
the alternatives and devise the best approach to new, comprehensive device
legislation. 18
The Cooper Committee (as it has become known) found that 10,000 injuries,
including 751 fatalities19, had occurred over a ten-year period. It concluded
that the current system had become inadequate. Requiring FDA to prove that
a product was adultered or misbranded had
HR. REP. No. 94-853, at 7-8.
'61d at 8-9.
Key examples of legitimate devices marketed without adequate testing in-
clude the Dalkon Shield intrauterine device, which was introduced in November
of 1970 and by mid-1975, had been linked to 16 deaths and 25 miscarriages;
faulty heart pacemakers, requiring recalls of 23,000 units; and implanted in-
traocular lenses that caused serious vision impairment, causing ve patients to
lose an eye. HR. REP. No. 94-853, at 8.
18
H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 8-9.
19 More specically, the Committee found that 512 deaths and 300 injuries
were caused by heart
valves; 89 deaths and 186 injuries by pacemakers; and ten deaths and 8,000
injuries from intrauterine devices. HR. REP. No. 94-853, at 8.
7
8become increasingly dicult as technology grew more complex, and limiting
the agency to ex post enforcement measures increased the amount of time the
dangerous products remained on the market, thus increasing the harm suered
by the public. In its 1970 report, the Committee proposed a balanced regulatory
system that would protect the public and give health care professionals more
condence in the devices they use or prescribe, without stiing the development
of medical technology. To minimize unnecessary intervention, the Committee
recommended a three-tier categorization of devices that would establish dierent
levels of agency oversight for dierent types of devices.20
In 1976, Congress enacted the Medical Device Amendments of 197621, adopt-
ing the regulatory system suggested by the Cooper Committee. As provided by
this statute, FDA was to classify all medical devices as tting into one of three
categories. Class I devices are items for which general controls are sucient
to ensure safety and eectiveness22; class II devices are those for which perfor-
mance standards must be established in order to guarantee safety and
23
eectiveness ; and class III devices are those for which premarket approval
is necessary to
provide assurance of safety and eectiveness.24 A device is deemed as class
III when insucient information exists to assure its safety through either the
class I or class II procedures25 and the device is used in supporting or sustaining
human life or is of substantial importance in preventing impairment of human
health, or presents a potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury.26 In
20
HR. REP. No. 94-853, at 10-12.
21 P L 94-295, 90 Stat. 539 (1976), codied at 21. U.S.C. xx 351, 352, 360,
360c-3601.
22
21 U S C x 360c(a)(1)(A).
23
21 U S C x 360c(a)(1)(B).
24
21 U S C x 360c(a)(l)(C).
25
21 U S C x 360c(a)(1)(C)(i).
26
21 U S C x 360c(a)(1)(C)(ii).
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9addition, any device that had been on the market before the amendment was
enacted, and is implanted into the human body, is presumptively class III unless
the reviewing panel can substantiate a recommendation that premarket approval
is not necessary in order to ensure safety and eectiveness.27
B. Breast Implant Regulation from 1976-1992
After the Medical Device Amendments were passed in 1976, the FDA Panel
on General and Plastic Surgery Devices recommended that silicone breast im-
plants be classied as a class II device on July 23, 1976.28 Two years later, the
Panel met and again recommended class II certication for silicone implants,
with a high priority for FDA to implement performance standards. Then, in
January of 1982, as part of a proposal to classify 55 general and plastic surgery
devices, FDA proposed that this type of implant be classied as a class III de-
vice. FDA's decision not to follow the Panel's advice was based both on the
statutory mandate to classify devices to be implanted in the body as category
III, as well as the agency's assessment that insucient information existed to
establish a performance standard that would provide reasonable assurance of
the safety and eectiveness of the device. At that time, FDA was primarily
concerned direct, local complications, yet also indicated that long-term toxic
eects might present an unreasonable risk.29
The Panel met again in January of 1983 to review and consider FDA's com-
ments and unanimously recommended a class III category for the implants. The
panel also recommended
27
21 U.S.C. x 360c(c)(2)(C).
28 See 53 Fed. Reg. 23856, 23862 (1988) (codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 878.3540)
(proposed June 24,
1988).
29
47 Fed. Reg. 23856 (1982) (codied at 21 C F R Pt 878 3540 ) (proposed
Jan. 19, 1982).
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10researching the eects of silicone migration, and in February of 1994, FDA,
in conjunction with the National Center for Toxicological Research, initiated a
study in animals to examine this question.30
In early 1987, Dow Corning learned of results of a study in which rats that
were implanted with a formulation of Dow Corning silicone gel showed an in-
creased incidence of cancerous tumors at the implant site. Dow's expert panel
evaluated the risks and concluded that there was no indication of risk to human
health; however, the company decided to share the information with FDA and
voluntarily submitted this study in August of that year.31
In June of 1988, FDA issued nal device classications, with silicone breast
implants to be class III, again noting that insucient information existed to
establish performance standards that would provide reasonable assurance of
safety and eectiveness of the devices.32 Later that year, FDA issued a state-
ment indicating that a patient warning should be developed for inclusion with
the implants. This decision followed an FDA study identifying high priority
devices.33 Then, in October, FDA announced that the class III status would be
discussed at an upcoming meeting of the advisory panel, at which the Dow data
submitted in August 1987 would also be reviewed)4
In November of 1988, Health Research Group (ITRG), a consumer protection
group focusing on health issues, became involved in the issue, releasing internal
FDA and Dow
30 Silicone Teratology Study in Animals Underway, M-D-D-I Reports, The
Gray Sheet (Jul. 23,
1984).
3i See Teich v. FDA, 751 F. Supp. 243, 246 (D.D.C. 1990)
32
21 C.F.R. Pt. 878.3540 (1997)
~ Mammary prosthesis: patient inserts explaining risks needed, FDA study
recommends, M-DD-I Reports, The Gray Sheet (Aug. 15, 1988).
34Mamma.iy implants Class III status is subject of upcoming FDA advisory
panel meeting, M-DD-I Reports, The Gray Sheet (Oct. 17, 1988).
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11memoranda regarding the Dow studies indicating that mice injected with sil-
icone had developed cancer: Later that month, the Panel met again, and at
this time, heard HIRG's allegations about Dow Corning's data on cancer in
mice)6 The Panel concluded that the implants should remain on the market,
yet recommended that further research be undertaken. Specically, the Panel
suggested that from that date until 1990, FDA and the American Society of
Plastic and Reconstructive Surgeons (ASPRS) conduct a review of the existing
national and international registries of implants to gather long-term data on
known clinical and preclinical risks related to implants, including carcinogenesis
and teratogenesis and immune disorders. The Panel also recommended studying
the manufacturers' complaint les.37
At the November panel meeting, the assembled experts sought to review
Dow Corning data on injectable silicone products, which had been submitted
to FDA in connection with a new drug application submitted before the 1976
Amendments were enacted. FDA was unable to locate these studies, however, so
the panel requested new copies of the information, as well as consumer complaint
les, from Dow Corning. In January of 1989, Dow Corning re-submitted these
studies, as well as later studies and a summary of its consumer complaint les.38
~ Silicone gel breast implants should be banned, Health Research Group tells
FDA, M-D-D-I
Reports, The Gray Sheet (Nov. 14, 1988).
'6Breast implants: FDA is surveying manufacturers complaint les, databases,
M-D-D-I
Reports, The Gray Sheet (Nov. 28, 1988).
~' See 55 Fed. Reg. 20568, 20570 (1990) (codied at 21 C.F.R. Pt. 878)
(proposed May 17, 1990
38
Teich, 751 F. Supp at 246. Shortly after Dow Corning submitted this data
to FDA, HRG led a Freedom of Information Act request to gain access to this
material, but FDA refused to release the data. Industty & Washington Memos,
M-D-D-I Reports, The Gray Sheet (Feb. 20, 1989). The matter eventually
was resolved through a suit in federal court, with a district court judge ruling
that the manufacturers' study data and customer complaint les were subject
to disclosure under FOJA. Teich, 751 F. Supp. at 255.
11
12FDA moved to initiate proceedings to require premarket approval (PMA) ap-
plications for 31 devices assigned high priority, including silicone implants, in
early January of 1989.~~ At this st age, the agency led a notice of intent to ini-
tiate proceedings.40 The proposed rule, however, was not announced until May
1990, at which time FDA announced the proposed requirements for PMAs for
implants. In this proposal, FDA indicated that it sought clinical data, includ-
ing retrospective epidemiological and prospective clinical studies to assess the
potential of cancer and other long-term complications associated with silicone
implants. According to the original timetable set by FDA, interested parties
had a 60-day period for comments, and the tentative deadline for the submis-
sion of PMAs was set for December 31 of 1990, after which the devices could
no longer be marketed without having FDA approval.41 Many delays, however,
prevented this plan from being implemented as scheduled.
The comment period had been slated to close in mid-July, but was extended
for an additional two months.42 By the comment period's closure on September
14, FDA had received 2,670 comments to evaluate.43 In December, the House of
Representatives Government Operations Committee held a hearing to investi-
gate the progress on this issue, at which time FDA indicated that the nal rule
calling for PMAs would be issued in March 1991, following a national conference
being convened in February.44
'~ 54 Fed. Reg. 550 (1989) (notice published Jan. 6, 1989).
40 Breast implant call for PMAs has been drafted by FDA device center,
M-D-D-I Reports, The
Gray Sheet (Jan. 30, 1989).
41 (codied
55 Fed. Reg. 20568, 20570 (1990) at 21 C F R pt. 878) (proposed
May 17, 1990).
42 s~ Fed. Reg. 29223 (1990) (codifed at 21. C FR Pt 878) (proposed Jul.
18, 1990).
~ Id
'Silicone Gel-lled implants: nal call for PMAs will issue in March 1991, M-
D-D-I Reports, The Gray Sheet (Dec. 24, 1990).
12
13Ultimately, the nal rule requiring PMAs was issued on April 10, 1991, requiring
manufacturers to submit PMAs by July 9. If PMAs were not submitted by that
time, commercial distribution was to cease.45 In September, FDA announced
that although it was still reviewing the data submitted by four manufacturers{
Bioplasty, Inc., McGhan Medical Corp. Mentor Corp. and Dow Corning46{it
had identied signicant deciencies in the PMAs for the silicone implants.
Until the nal decision was made regarding the PMAs, FDA would regard any
device as misbranded that did not provide adequate written information to
patients on the potential risks associated with silicone implants. The agency
issued a sample patient warning notice, which focused on the risks of local
complications and also raised the possibility that silicone migration could cause
cancer or autoimmune diseases.47
Although FDA was dissatised with the data contained in the four PMAs,
the advisory panel met in mid-November to evaluate the applications and hear
testimony from physicians, patients, advocacy groups, and others. The panel
issued a number of conclusions and recommendations. First, the panel deter-
mined that the available data did not provide reasonable assurance of the safety
and eectiveness of these devices and agreed with FDA's scientists that the
clinical data provided by the manufacturers were not adequate to alleviate the
safety concerns. Because the panel also decided that the breast implants served
a public health need, it voted unanimously to recommend that FDA keep the
device on market while further data were
56 Fed. Reg. 14620 (1991).
46 Citizen Petition on behalf of medical professional and cancer patient
advocacy groups to FDA,
Sept. 19, 1996, at 8 n.7.
56 Fed. Reg. 49098 (1991) (notice published Sept. 26, 1991).
13
14collected.48 The panel also suggested that FDA establish a patient registry to
enable manufacturers to track patients and outcomes.49
After the November 1991 panel meeting, FDA received information about
data that had not been presented to the panel. The data indicated that one
manufacturer had not followed satisfactory quality control procedures to pre-
vent safety problems, had not undertaken adequate animal studies before the
products were promoted for human use, and did not act on evidence indicat-
ing problems that had been acquired years earlier. It was also at this time that
FDA became aware of the possible association between implants and connective
tissue diseases.50
In light of this new evidence, On January 6, 1992, FDA Commissioner David
Kessler decided to request a voluntary moratorium on the distribution of im-
plants until the advisory panel could evaluate the newly-acquired information.5'
After Kessler announced the moratorium, further information was revealed, re-
garding the silent rupture problem. 52
The panel reconvened in mid-February of 1992 to hear testimony from doc-
tors, companies and consumers. At this stage, the discussions focused on the
incidence and hazards from ruptures and gel bleed, the possible link to autoim-
mune disease, and the industry's record on testing, reporting and marketing
of these implants over the preceding 30 years. After these hearing, the panel
issued four recommendations, most notably altering its stance on the continuing
availability of silicone gel implants on the market. The panel now recommended
that further use of these
48 Panel Issues Breast Implant Recommendations, Nov. 15, 1991 (FDA
talking paper T9 1-72); Kessler statement, supra note 3.
49
Kessler statement, supra note 3. In March 1992, FDA proposed a regulation
to establish a
device tracking requirement for certain categories of devices, including breast
implants. 57 Fed. Reg. 10702 (1992) (codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 821) (proposed
March 27, 1992).
Kessler statement, supra note 3.
51
57 Fed. Reg. 3634, 3635 (1992) (notice published Jan. 30, 1992).
52
Kessler statement, supra note 3.
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15implants be restricted to use by women participating in scientic protocols,
with unrestricted access for women needing breast reconstruction but limiting
the number of women seeking augmentation to that needed to study the safety
of implants for this type of patient. Further, the moratorium was to continue
until FDA decided how to proceed given these new recommendations. The
panel also suggested that epidemiological studies be conduct to assess the risk
of autoimmune disease, yet concluded that no causal link had been established
thus far. In addition, the panel recommended that women with implants be
checked regularly to ensure that their implants had not ruptured, and that
the manufacturers must provide adequate preclinical data on the chemical and
physical properties of the implants.5 ~
Two months later, FDA's Commissioner adopted the panel's recommenda-
tion to limit the availability of implants. For reconstructive purposes, the man-
ufacturers' PMAs were left open with studies to continue for additional data
collection. For augmentation purposes, however, the PMAs were denied and
manufacturers were then required to submit Investigation Device Exemptions
to conduct FDA-approved research studies. The moratorium on distribution
ended with the agency's actions on the PMAs.54
C. Post-1992 Ban
Four months after FDA's PMA decision were announced, the agency ap-
proved clinical studies of silicone implants to be conducted by Mentor Corp.,
which limited participation to
~ Id; FDA Panel Makes Breast Implant Recommendations, Feb. 20, 1992
(FDA press release T92-9).
Kessler statement, supra note 3.
15
16women needing reconstructive surgery or implant replacements.55 Meanwhile,
private researchers continued to explore the possible risks of silicone implant,
particularly autoimmune diseases. In March 1993, FDA reported the results of
animal studies showing that silicone gel can act as antibody adjuvant. As a
result, the agency amended its patient information regulations, requiring man-
ufacturers to update information about the possible connection in the informed
consent documents used to apprise women undergoing implant surgery of the
possible risks.56 On other fronts, however, several epidemiological studies were
published indicating that no link could be established between silicone implants
and autoimmune diseases.57 An April 1996 review of the literature regarding
the safety of breast implants revealed that no study has indicated that the rate
of well-dened connective tissue disease or breast cancer has greatly increased in
women with silicone breast implants, but no studies have ruled out a moderate
increase. In addition, there are not yet adequate studies assessing the frequency
of local complications, particularly rupture and capsular contracture.58
FDA Approves Clinical Studies of Silicone Breast Implants, Aug. 3, 1992
(talking paper T92-35).
56
Immunology Studies on Silicone Gel, Mar. 22, 1993 (FDA talking paper
T93-15).
~ See, e.g., D. Schottenfeld, et al., The Design of a Population-Based Case-
Control Study of
Systemic Sclerosis (Scleroderma,): Commentary on the University of Michi-
gan Study, 48 J. CLIN.
EPIDEMIOL. 583 (April 1995); SE. Gabriel, et al., Risk of Connective-
Tissue Diseases and Other
Disorders after Breast Implantation, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1697 (June
16, 1994); H.J. Englert,
et al., Scleroderma and Augmentation Mammoplasty {A Causal Relationship?,
24 AUST. N.Z.
J. MID. 74 (February 1994); M. Schusterman, et al., Incidence ofAu-
toimmune Disease in
Patients After Breast Reconstruction with Silicone Gel Implants Versus Au-
togenous Tissue: A
Preliminary Report, 31 ANN. PLAST. SURG. 1 (July 1993); CE. Dugowson,
et al., Silicone Breast
Implants and Risk for Rheumatoid Arthritis, 35 ARTI-RITIS RHEUM. (SUm.),
ABSTRACT 192:S 66
(September 1992).
58 The search 0/medical literature on the safety of breast implants adapted
from the Annals of
Internal Medicine, April IS, 1996, HEALTI-IFACTS, (Center for Med. Con-
sumers, Inc.), May
1996, at 2.
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17IV. Analysis of FDA Actions
A. Timing of Eorts
1. Moving Too Slowly
FDA was criticized, particularly by members of Congress, for its delay in
acting to regulate silicone breast implants.59 Although it seems that little oc-
curred between the late 1970s and early 1980s and 199160 when FDA issued its
nal rule requiring the submission of PMA applications, when one looks at the
internal processes within the agency, this charge loses much of its weight. It
seems that no action was taken between 1983 and 1988, but once the device was
provisionally categorized as a class III device in the middle of 1988, the agency
made relatively steady progress, particularly in light of the fact that collecting
adequate data on safety and eectiveness is by necessity a process that requires
several years.
2. Moving Too Ouickly
From the other side, FDA has been attacked for moving too rapidly to limit
market availability of the implants while the data were not conclusive.61 The
coalition of cancer patient advocacy groups and medical professionals who have
petitioned the agency to reconsider its policy have argued that under the Safe
Medical Devices Act of 199062, which amended the
595ee, e.g., REPORT ON TI-IF ACTIVITY OF THE COMMITTEE ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE, H.R.
REP No 102-1096, 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess.(1992), available in WESTLAW,
1992 WL 405925
(Leg. Hist.).
60
In 1971, FDA compiled an inventory of potential devices to be regulated.
This list included
approximately 8,000 separate devices. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 11. Given
the immense scope of the regulatory burden that had been added to the agency's
domain, it is understandable that FDA could not act quickly for each of these
items.
61 Citizen Petition, supra note 46, at 7.
62 Safe Medical Devices Act, Pub. L. 101-629, 104 Stat. 4511(1990), 21
U.S.C. xx 301 note,
321, 333, 351, 353, 360, 360c-j, 3601, 3SOgg-hh, 360ii-ss, 42 U.S.C. xx 263b-
n.
17
18Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, the agency had until December 1, 1995,
to reclassify the implants.63 This argument seems to ignore both the develop-
ment of the agency's policy as well as the provisions of the statute.
As implantable devices, the silicone prostheses were presumptively catego-
rized as class III, and could only be reclassied into a lower category with
evidence that the more stringent requirement were not necessary.64 Given the
state of information regarding the safety of the breast implants, it is clear that
FDA had no choice but to classify the implants as class III. In addition, the
agency had already reviewed the class III status in the middle of 1988{over
a year before the House Subcommittee had held the hearings that led to the
passage of the 1990 Amendments.65 In sum, given that the classication of the
silicone implants had already been reviewed, it is unclear that the provisions of
the 1990 Amendments were applicable at all.
Even if the 1990 Amendments were intended to cover those class III devices
that had previously been reviewed, Congress enacted the 1990 amendments to
streamline the regulatory
66
process , not to provide a basis for delaying a PMA process that had already
begun. Having classied silicone implants as class III in June 1988, the agency
could have required PMA
application submissions from the manufacturers as early as December 31,
1990.67 Although it did not issue the nal rule until April of 1991 and therefore
moved the nal PMA application
63 Citizen Petition, supra note 46, at 7.
64
21 U.S.C. x 360c(c)(2)(C).
65
REPORT ON TI-fE ACTIVITY OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE, HR. REP. No. 101-398, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess (1990), available
in WESTLAW, 1990 WL 259119 (Leg. Hist.).
66
HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, REPORT ON P.L.
101-629, SAFE MEDICAL DEVICES ACTOF 1990, HR. REP. No. 101-808,
101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990), reprinted in
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6305, available in WESTLAW, 1990 WL 200530 (Leg.
Hist.).
67
In fact, this date was the preliminary deadline that FDA had established
when it issued the
proposed rule for the PMA applications in May of 1990. 55 Fed. Reg. 20568
(1990) (codied at 21 C.F.R. pt. 878) (proposed May 17, 1990).
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19submission deadline to July, 199168, FDA would have been following Congres-
sional mandate by proceeding as quickly as possible, not by revisiting the issue
of class III categorization.
B. Decision-making Process
1. Factors Aecting Timing
Critics have charged that FDA's actions were stimulated by improper mo-
tives. According to this view, rather than moving forward with the regulatory
process because the agency had determined{on some sort of rational basis{that
the risks and benets silicone implants should be scrutinized more closely, FDA
only paid attention to the problem when the litigation surrounding implants had
increased and the media had drawn attention the issue, creating public pressure
for
69
action. Essentially, the charge is that the agency was inuenced by politics
and other extra-scientic concerns instead of being directed by science.
Such a purist vision of how FDA ought to operate does not account for the
administrative system operating in the Unites States. While an administra-
tive agency ought to operate dierently than a legislature in that professional
expertise ought to ground the organization's decisions, an agency cannot be
immune to public opinion regarding the agency's policies. Even if one's notions
of democracy would be untroubled by a system in which government profes-
sionals are entirely unaected by the ideas of the populace, it is naive to think
that this degree of insularity is possible in the United States. An appointed
agency chief is ultimately accountable to the President, who is expected to con-
sider the political implications of a particular decision. This fact in itself makes
politics an element an administrator must consider. In addition, an intelligent
policy-maker
68
21 C.F.R. Pt. 878.3540 (1997).
e.g., ANGELL, supra note 1, at 25.
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20understands that a certain degree of overlap between what the public perceives
is a wise policy and what truly is a wise policy is necessary in order for a
program to be implemented.70 If the public perceives a new a policy as unwise,
the government leader stands little chance of achieving her goals, no matter
how sound the police may be. Thus, an agency executive must be aware of the
prevailing views among the electorate, so that her policies are not thwarted by
legislative bodies that are empowered to limit the agency's discretion.
One must also acknowledge that the inactivity of an agency can also be the
result of political choices. As some commentators have pointed out, under the
Reagan administration, the lax regulatory stance gave FDA ocials little in-
centive to promulgate new regulations.71 If this is the case, the changes in the
political climate and the pressures placed on Congress by panicky constituents
that pushed the agency to act more quickly can be viewed as a necessary cor-
rective for the politically motivated choices of the previous administration.
Leaving aside the questions of the proper role of politics in agency decision-
making, it remains unclear what inuence extra-scientic factors did have. In
terms of FDA's pace in acting on the silicone implant issue, a variety of factors
impacted the progress of the agency's activities. Although the early lawsuits
probably contributed to the release of new information regarding potential haz-
ards of the device, the spurt of litigation did not occur until after the 1992
72 73
moratorium ,and well after FDA had intensied its scrutiny of silicone im-
plants, making it
70 Philip B. Heymann, Relations Between Politics and Policy (Sept. 14,
1996) (course materials from Problems of Law Enforcement, Harvard Law School,
fall semester, 1996) (on le with
author).
71 HR. REP. No. 102-1096.
72
Dow Corning reported an increase in lawsuits from about 200 at the end of
1991 to 10,000 by
the end of 1992. ANGELL, supra note 1, at 69 (citing interview with Bane
S. Carmichael, Dow Corning corporate vice-president, TJFR HEALTH NEWS
REPORTER (June 1995)).
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21impossible that the fallout from the lawsuits spurred the agency to act. The
trickle of anecdotal medical evidence regarding possible immune system prob-
lems, as well as the data on cancer submitted by Dow in 1987, also contributed
to FDA's decision that the time for an evaluation had arrived.
FDA undoubtedly was driven by appropriate scientic concerns, as well as
constraints on administrative resources74, but it is also accurate to conclude
that politics did play some role in pressing FDA for decisive action on silicone
breast implants. The agency was criticized by the House of Representatives'
Committee on Government Operations late in 1990, with the subcommittee
concluding that FDA should respond more quickly and strongly in requiring
that adequate information be collected to assess the risks of silicone implants.75
Nonetheless, Congressional inquiries of this sort are not inherently an inap-
propriate mechanism for aecting policy. Congress can delegate certain powers
to administrative agencies~ yet in order to maintain the balance of powers man-
dated by the Constitution, these agencies remain accountable to Congress.76 If
Congressional pressure for agency action results from one powerful member ex-
ing her muscles on behalf of a particular interest group or a powerful constituent,
one's objections to the interference with agency policy would be justied. When
'~ For example, the major case that revealed the risk of connective tissue
diseases was not decided until late in 1991{after the PMAs had been submitted
and found inadequate. See Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 1992 WL 176560
(ND. Cal. 1992).
One should remember that the pressure to address curative and preventive
measures for AIDS had intensied during the late 1 980s, a period of increasing
burdens and decreasing resources for FDA. See Larry Thompson, FDA Faces
Many Other Problems, Too, WASH. POsT, Aug. 22, 1989. It is thus possible
that when this issue became a top priority, FDA attention, if not resources, was
diverted.
~ HR. REP. No. 101-1006.
76
For a discussion of the doctrine and mechanisms of legislative delegation to
administrative
agencies, see PETER L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ch. 2, x I (9thed. 1995).
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22Congress probes into agency inaction on a subject that the agency's own sta
and advisory panel have deemed important, however, this type of oversight is
an example of the way Congress can see that its mandate is being fullled. Of
course, most inquiries into agency policy will not fall neatly into one category or
the other, and people may disagree as to whether a particular instance demon-
strates legitimate Congressional supervision or strong-arming to please special
interests. As a general matter, however, it is both unavoidable and desirable
that politics{through legislative checks on administrative agencies{will impact
agency decisions.
22
232. Factors AJ/ecting Outcome
Critics of FDA's handling of the silicone implant issue have also claimed
that the actual decision reached was tainted by both improper evidence and the
biases or lack of qualications of panel members. Several commentators have
noted that at the February 1992 hearings, the data indicating a connection
between silicone breast implants and connective tissue diseases were not merely
insucient to establish such a connection, but were also not the type of data
that should be used to conclude that a particular risk factor{i.e., silicone breast
implants{is connected to the incidence of a particular symptom or disease.77
Epidemiological data is the appropriate basis for judgments of this sort,
yet no solid epidemiological studies had been completed by February of 1992.
Instead, the panel members heard only anecdotal evidence of doctors who had
observed a connection between women with breast implants and connective
tissue diseases. As has been noted by both doctors analyzing the breast implant
saga78 and the members of Congress who drafted the device amendment79,
this type of anecdotal evidence should not be used as the basis of conclusions
regarding the level of a particular risk. The unreliability of anecdotes is well-
illustrated by the breast implant case. The
77
JAMA, supra note 8; Hearings on Silicone Implants Before the Subcomm.
on Human
Resources and Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Gov-
ernment Reform and
Oversight, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statement of John S. Sergent,
M.D., Chairman,
Department of Medicine, St. Thomas Hospital, Professor of Medicine, Van-
derbilt Univ. School of
Medicine), available in WESTLAW, 1995 WL 460638 (F.D.C.H.) [hereinafter
Sargent
statement]; Hearings on Silicone Implants Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources and
Intergovernmental Relations of the House Comm. on Government Reform and
Oversight, 104th
Cong., 1st Sess.(1991) (statement of Elizabeth B. Connell, M.D, Professor,
Dept. of Gynecology
and Obstetrics, Emory Univ. School of Medicine), available in WESTLAW,
1995 WL 457360
(F. D.C.H.) [hereinafter Connell statement].
78 JAMA, supra note 877; Sargent statement, supra note 77; Connell state-
ment, supra note 77;
ANGELL, supra note 169, at 105.
HR. REP. No. 94-853, at 17.
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24awareness that the connection might exist, which grew dramatically after the
1992 ban, increased the likelihood that women who are ill would come to at-
tention. Further, certain doctors gained a reputation for believing that the link
was real and thus became a magnet for women with connective tissue diseases
who also had breast implants, and the resulting reporting bias is likely to have
inuenced the data signicantly. 80 If the weakness of anecdotal evidence as a
general matter was suciently clear to the non-scientist legislators that drafted
the device amendment, Kessler and his sta should have been able to distinguish
between information that merely signaled an area for further research from data
that genuinely indicated a correlation between the risk factor and the disease.
One of the physicians who served on the February 1992 panel, Dr. John
Sargent, also has pointed out that the group assembled was not qualied to make
the assessments that FDA sought. While the panelists may have been experts
in their particular elds, the cumulative expertise was nonetheless inadequate
for evaluating the connection between connective tissue diseases and silicone
breast implants. The panel contained only two rheumatologists, the specialists
who best understand these illnesses, and the only epidemiologist and the only
immunologist on the panel were not familiar with the diagnostic challenges
presented by these complex rheumatic diseases.81 The panel's suitability was
further compromised by the fact that some members had stated, on record, their
views opposing implants, with this opposition often having little or nothing to do
with connective tissue diseases.82 In addition, before the November 1991 panel
meetings, FDA revoked the voting privileges of ve panelists when opposition
arose to the participation of three
80 ANGELL, supra note 1, at 105; Sargent statement, supra note 77.
81 Sargent statement, supra note 77.
24
25physicians with strong ties to plastic surgery trade associations and two doctors
who had testied
83
or consulted on behalf of plaintis involved in implant litigation. The weak-
nesses of both panels illustrate that FDA was not suciently careful in its
selection of panelists.
C. Kessler's Controversial Decisions
David Kessler has been criticized for his handling of the implant situation
in 1992. The
voluntary moratorium declared on January 6, together with the eventual
ban announced in April,
84
which co
drew tremendous media attention nsequently fed the growing panic
among women
who already had or were considering silicone implants,85 and caused a surge
in the litigation against implant manufacturers.86 In addition, the policy of re-
stricting access for implants for women seeking augmentation has been viewed
as both unfair and irrational. Although the basic conclusion that the manufac-
turers had not met their burden of proving that the devices were safe has not
been questioned87, the policies based on this evaluation were not chosen wisely.
1. The Voluntary Moratorium and the Ensuing Ban
Even if Kessler was correct in concluding that the data acquired late in 1991
were signicant to warrant a change in FDA policy, declaring a moratorium on
the use of silicone implants was unnecessarily drastic given the nature of the
new information. The documents
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Citizen Petition, supra note 46, at 8 n. 8 (citing Breast Implant Foe Loses
Vote on Safety Panel,
Boston Globe, Feb. 13, 1992, at A3).
84 Connell statement, supra note 77.
851d
86 See supra note 72 and accompanying text; Jack C. Fisher, The Silicone
Controversy{ When
Will Science Prevail?, 326 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1696-1698 (1992).
87 ANGELL, supra note 1, at 21.
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26indicated that manufacturers had not followed adequate quality control mea-
sures and had not conducted thorough preclinical tests, and that some physi-
cians reported an association between connective tissue disorders and breast im-
plants, a connection that immunologists conrmed was the subject of concern.88
Kessler was right to be convinced that consumers might [have been] at greater
risk than [the agency] had anticipated earlier,89 but given the absence of any epi-
demiological data supporting the suspicions regarding connective tissue diseases,
and the fact that the information did not point to the possibility of immediately
life-threatening risks, Kessler's response was an overreaction.90
Dr. Elizabeth Connell, chair of the advisory panel in November 1991 and
in February 1992, has expressed concern that [b]ecause of the intense and often
misleading media coverage of this issue, particularly after the moratorium, we
have seen fear, panic, and incredible levels of distress.., among those women
who have been led to believe that they were wearing very dangerous devices
and were at risk for serious health consequences.91 While Kessler cannot have
been expected to predict the exact extent of the media and public reaction, in
light of the media scrutiny that had already intensied by that time, Kessler
should have foreseen that such an unprecedented and extreme step would have
a major impact on public perception regarding the safety of implants. At the
very least, he should have considered whether other measures, such as issuing
a statement to surgeons with updated information to be shared with patients,
would have
88
Kessler statement, supra note 3.
89 Id
90 Although FDA was statutorily directed to respond to the PMA applica-
tions by January 6, the
statute also gives the Secretary the authority to extend the period in which
action is to be taken if he nds the continued availability is necessary for the
public health. 21 U.S.C. xx 360e(d)(1)(A), 360e(d)( 1 )(B)(i).
91 Connell statement, supra note 77.
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27provided sucient protection until the advisory panel could reconvene the fol-
lowing month to
92
fully asses the new evidence.
Because the ban, together with the attendant media coverage, has exagger-
ated the risk of
implants in the minds of the public, FDA has the duty to undertake the task
of updating the public. Doctors have called upon the agency to issue a public
statement regarding the consensus that has developed in the medical community
indicating that the epidemiological evidence now available indicates little, if any,
connection between silicone implants and connective tissue diseases.93
The January and April actions may also have had a broader impact on FDA'
s ability to inuence public opinion. By wielding the powerful tool of a morato-
rium to control a risk that was relatively small on the scale of potential public
health hazards, Kessler may have weakened the impact that a future moratorium
might have in the event of a more serious threat to public safety, and eroded the
public's condence in the agency's competence in risk evaluation. On a more
general note, by exaggerating the risk of implants, Kessler has exacerbated the
problems Americans face in comparing relative risks accurately.94
2. Final Decision Allowing Dierent Access/or Reconstruction than Aug-
mentation
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of FDA's 1992 actions was the decision
to draw a distinction between the degree of access to be aorded women seek-
ing reconstructive surgery, and that granted to women seeking augmentation.
Physicians and consumer groups alike viewed
92
We cannot know what choices were in Kessler's mind, yet in his explanation
of his policies, he
has not indicated that he considered, but ruled out, a less drastic measure.
~ Connell statement, supra note 77.
~ See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 175-176 for a discussion of Americans' poor
track record in
evaluating health risks.
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28this as an inappropriate dierentiation, which deprived American women of
their ability to choose the risks they feel are worth taking.95
Kessler has oered two justications for drawing the distinction between
the categories of women seeking implants. First, he argues that the benets
of reconstructive surgery are higher than those receive by women seeking aug-
mentation. He acknowledges that the needs of both groups are cosmetic, but
ultimately concludes that the needs of the patient who desires
,,96 he
He oers t
reconstructive surgery dier from those of the patient who desires augmen-
tation.
fact that insurance companies generally pay for reconstructive surgery{which
he categorizes as an integral part of cancer treatment, while they will not reim-
burse patients for augmentation, as evidence that there is a societal consensus
that the former is more important. Kessler's second defense is that women
seeking augmentation face an additional risk that women having undergone
mastectomies do not, i.e., the risk that breast cancer will be more dicult to
detect. He has said that this is the reason why the risk-benet analysis yields
dierent results for the two groups of
97
women.
These arguments are weak for several reasons. First, Kessler's conclusion
that [i]t makes
,,98
little sense for the FDA to consider breast augmentation of equivalent im-
portance with reconstructive surgery is essentially a value judgment, as his
discussion of social norms reveals.
~ See Cal~/ornia Society of Plastic Surgeons Group Says FDA Sets Doubk
Standard on Silicone
Gel Breast Implants, CANCER WEEKLY, May 4, 1992; JAMA, supra note
8; ANGEII, supra note
1, at 63.
96 David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA 's Decision On Breast Implants
(Special Report), 326
N. ENG. J. MED. 1713-15 (1992). 97Id
98 Id
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He then refers to the policies of insurance companies as if the decisions
regarding reimbursement or compensation contain no element of value judg-
ment. For example, the fact that some insurance plans will reimburse women
for contraception, while others will not, reects dierences in values among those
making the choices as to which items will be covered.
Because Kessler's policy is based on a subjective evaluation of the benets
of breast implants, it should not be the basis for FDA policy. One might per-
sonally feel that reconstructive surgery comes closer to being a necessity than
does augmentation, much as one might agree that plastic surgery to correct
scarring from an accident is more necessary than the standard facelift (and the
reimbursement policies of insurance companies may support this distinction as
well), yet one also must acknowledge that this calibration is in fact a value judg-
ment. While it is true that by establishing FDA, we have chosen to surrender a
degree of our autonomy as consumers, an imprecise criterion such as psycholog-
ical benet is an insuciently objective basis for limiting the choices of women
seeking augmentation.
Kessler denies that he is making a value judgment, and asserts that the
policy distinguishes between the categories of patients based on the increased
risk faced by women seeking augmentation, not based on the lesser benet.99
By shifting his emphasis to this reason for the distinction, Kessler implicitly
acknowledges that the dierence in benets is a subjective evaluation. If the
initial justication were not a value judgment, why did Kessler feel compelled
to put forward the second rationale?
The dierences in resistance levels between the two groups of women neces-
sitate conducting clinical trials with both types of subjects, a fact that probably
underlies the agency's
29
30decision to allow women seeking augmentation to receive silicone implants on
a limited basis. If two sets of trials were needed, however, it is unclear why
the agency decided that only the women seeking reconstructive surgery should
have unlimited access. With the ethical concerns surrounding the participation
of women who have had cancer, restricting the participation of these women to
the minimum number necessary to collect adequate data would seem to have
been the best policy. Thus, it is hard to believe that the agency was not making a
distinction between the two groups on the benet side of the equation. Without
valuing the benet derived by the women having reconstructive surgery more
highly, the sensible policy would have been to treat the two groups the same,
because each faced a risk that the other did not. In fact, in light of the fact that
approximately 80 percent of women who desire implants are patients undergoing
augmentation100 if either group was to have increased access, one could argue
that it is the women wanting augmentation who should have been granted this
advantage.
Even if Kessler's focus on the complications in detecting cancer in women
with implants is not pretextual, there are reasons to question whether this
decision is sound. Given the uncertainty surrounding the magnitude of the risk
these women face101, Kessler has not articulated why the added risk is sucient
to tip the balance, particularly if the alleged increased benet for women with
reconstruction is not part of the calculus. In addition, with Kessler's genuine
concern for protecting vulnerable patients, it is curious that he has not addressed
the additional risk for autoimmune disease that women who have suered from
cancer may face.'02
100 FDA Calls for a Moratorium on the Use of Silicone Gel Breast Implants
(FDA press release P92-i).
101 Although there is some indication that implants interfere with eective
breast cancer detection,
some authorities believe that women with implants are less at risk than those
without because the women with implants are more conscientious about routine
testing. JAMA, supra note 8.
102 See Kessler, supra note 96.
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31V. Conclusion
In the end, the decision to restrict availability of silicone breast implants was
appropriate. FDA has been clearly directed by Congress to withhold approval
for a medical devices that have not been proven safe and eective, and as of
1992, the implant manufacturers had failed to meet this burden. There were,
however, problems in how FDA handled the matter, which can provide insight
for improving the agency's performance. First, FDA should be more rigorous in
screening data that is submitted to an advisory panel. If the agency is charging a
panel with the task of making a decision on an item's safety, anecdotal evidence
should not be accorded the same weight as epidemiological data.
Second, the agency should attempt to tailor the composition of its advi-
sory panels more closely to the expertise required by the particular devices or
drugs being evaluated. Even if there are general panels for most cases, when a
product presents a particularly complicated question, the agency should nd ex-
perts with specialized expertise to supplement or replace the standing members.
While FDA attempted to follow this type of procedure by adding two rheuma-
tologists to the February 1992 panel, the degree of specialization required was
still not met. In addition, although the agency cannot be entirely free from
external, political forces, more care is needed when selecting panel members, to
minimize the risk of bias by the evaluators.
Third, FDA must recognize that part of its mandate involves educating
the public, and to this end, it must be aware of the impact of its decisions
on public perceptions. Not only does this obligate the agency to provide the
latest information on the health and safety issues, but it also requires that the
administrators assess the impact a policy decision will have when announced.
31
32Thus, the armative duty to inform the public is coupled with a duty to refrain
from conveying information in a manner that will unnecessarily cause panic.
Additionally, when public opinion has already diverged from an accurate as-
sessment of a certain risk, FDA should act to correct these misperceptions.
The last problem with FDA's decision, the distinction between women desir-
ing reconstructive surgery from those seeking augmentation, illustrates the prob-
lems that arise if FDA allows subjective judgments to cloud the decision-making
process. In the end, however, the line between subjective value-judgments and
objective science is not clear. The agency attempts to nd the appropriate bal-
ance between protecting public health and allowing consumers to make their
own choices regarding risks, and some issues relating to values necessarily enter
the equation. FDA chose poorly in this instance, yet if we are to have an agency
that we entrust with protecting public health, we must acknowledge that some
errors in one direction or the other will occur.
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